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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Discrediting witnesses as to their knowledge of the general reputation of the defendant gives rise to a close question.
Any circumstances detracting from a witness's credibility are
competent for impeachment by cross-examination. But the range of
such circumstances that may also be shown extrinsically is narrower.
The distinction, sometimes difficult to draw, is said to be between
discrediting the witness generally and discrediting him in the cause.
Thus, while it may not be shown that the witness does not have the
intelligence of an ordinary person,1 1 it may be shown that he does
not have full knowledge of the matter in controversy. 12 But though
the evidence in the principal case would be admissible on this theory,
it should be excluded on the ground of prejudice.
Where the primary purpose and the ultimate effect of discrediting
the testimony is to put before the jury particular facts not otherwise
competent the court should have the discretion to exclude such
evidence. Instructing the jury to consider the evidence only as discrediting the witness has little practical effect.

W. E. ANGLIN.
Insurance-Status of Beneficiaries as Such as Altered
by Changed Circumstances.
At the time that insured took out a benefit certificate, he was
married to a woman who had several children by a former marriage.
She was named as beneficiary with the insured's children, which term
was specifically defined to include step-children, as secondary beneficiaries. She divorced the insured and later remarried. A recent
Federal case awards his brother, named as third in line of beneficiaries, the proceeds against the claims of the ex-step-children.' The
holding was based on the rule that in benefit society 2 insurance only
certain classes of persons closely related to the insured can take.8
"Bell v. Rinner, 16 Oh. St. 45 (1864).
" Harrington v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 229 Mass. 421, 118 N. E. 880
(1918) (a witness in a tort action testified that he did not know of any place
where a certain structure was used. Held, it is competent to show that such
structure was used at a particular place).
1Brotherhood

of Loc. Firemen v. Hogan, 5 F. Supp. 598 (D. C. Minn.

1934).
' "Benefit society" is used in preference to the more usual term "mutual" as
being more indicative of the distinction between straight life and insurance
provided by benevolent societies.
' The limitation is commonly made by the constitutions of these societies

which are incorporated into the contracts of insurance. Some states have
statutes imposing similar limitations. N. C. CODE AN . (Michie, 1931) §6491.
The restriction is one on who may take, hence it has been held that although

NOTES AND COMMENTS
The ex-step-children lost their rights when they ceased to belong to
any such class. The case raises the problem of when changed circumstances will alter the standing of beneficiaries as such. It is to
be noted that where the particular change is contemplated and provided for in the policy itself, its terms will prevail and hence no
problem arises. 4 Because of this, in all of these cases the intent of
the insured is material.5
The rule generally announced is that when an ordinary life policy
issues the beneficiary takes a vested interest,6 but that in benefit society insurance no interest vests until the death of the insured.7
As a result of this rule, it is usually held that where the beneficiary is named, even though he predecease the insured, the former's estate will take.8 The word "wife" used in apposition is
generally held to be a mere description and therefore not material.9
However, when the designation is merely "wife" or "Mrs. Insured"
and a second wife is left, there is a division of authority, the argument being mainly over the insured's intention. 10 The case presents
more difficulty when a class is named, as "my wife and children.""
One group of courts, led by New York, holds that the interest vests
in the class as joint tenants; hence the survivors at the insured's
a beneficiary was designated as being in one class and later, by way of divorce,
fell out of that, but remained in another, she still took. Rose v. Brotherhood,
80 Colo. 344, 251 Pac. 537 (1926).
'Sherwood v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 166 La. 905, 118 So. 78 (1928) (Policy
named children and provided that the survivors at the time of the insured's
death should take); Fleming v. Grimes, 142 Miss. 522, 107 So. 420 (1926)
(Policy provided that the interest of beneficiary revert to insured on the former's prior death).
"Pike County Mut. Life Ass'n. v. Berry, 214 Ill. App. 316 (1919) ; Pape v.
Pape, 67 Ind.App. 153, 119 N. E. 11 (1918). _
' Preston v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 95 Md. 101, 51 Ati. 838 (1902);
Hooker v. Sugg, 102 N. C. 115, 8 S. E. 919 (1889) ; NoTE (1927) 75 U. PA. L.
Rav. 155.
' Supreme Council v. Behrend, 247 U. S. 394, 38 Sup. Ct. 522, 62 L. ed.
1182 (1917) ; Wooten v. Odd Fellows, 176 N. C. 52, 96 S.E. 654 (1918).
Preston v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 6.
' Doney v. Eq. Life Assur. Soc. of the U. S., 97 N. J.L. 393, 117 Atl. 618

(1922).

0That the former wife takes against the present wife. Day v. Case, 43
Hun. 179 (N. Y. 1887). That the present wife takes. Modern Woodmen v.
Allin, 301 I11.
119, 133 N. E. 677 (1921).
nx
McLin v. Calvert, 78 Ky. 472 (1880) was a bizarre holding showing the
difficulty which courts experienced in disposing of the problem. In that case,
insurance payable to the wife and children of the insured was divided in the
proportions designated by the statute regulating the distribution of surplus personal property. The holding was subsequently overruled in Bell v. Kinneer,
101 Ky. 271, 40 S.W. 686 (1897).
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death take all the proceeds. 12 Another group, among them North
Carolina, states that the interest vests individually and that therefore
the estates of the deceased take equally with the survivors. 13 It
would be more consonant with the latter rule to hold that in such
cases a child born after the policy issued would take,'1 4 but on an
analogy to wills, such children are generally included. 1
In England, under the Married Women's Property Act,' 6 where
the policy is payable to the "wife" or the "wife and children" a trust
is set up for the beneficiary and when, because of her death, the
trust cannot be performed, the fund results to the estate of the
insured. i
When a spouse is beneficiary, what effect will a subsequent divorce
have on his right to take? Except in Texas, where a continuing
insurable interest is required of the beneficiary,1 8 the holding has
been, when he was named, that a divorce has no effect'0 and the
words "husband" and "wife" in apposition were not conditions, but
descriptions only.20 But in a case involving benefit insurance, where
only the word "wife" was used, an opposite result was reached by
considering the insured's probable intention.2 1 The question has ilot
'Bell v. Kinneer, supra note 11; Schneider v. N. W. Mut. Ben. Life Ins.
Co., 33 Mo. App. 64 (1888) ; U. S. Trust Co. v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 115
N. Y. 405, 21 N. E. 1025 (1889); Elgar v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.
S., 113 Wis. 90, 88 N. W. 927 (1902).

- Cont. Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn. 60 (1875); Germania Life Ins.

Co. v. Wirtz, 196 Mich. 145, 162 N. W. 981 (1917) ; Hooker v. Sugg, supra
note 6; Glenn v. Burns, 100 Tenn. 295, 45 S. W. 784 (1898).
4Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 15 R. I. 106, 23 Atl. 105 (1885).
"Pape v. Pape, supra note 5; Schull v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 132 N. C. 30,
43 S. E. 504 (1903); Thomas v. Leake, 67 Tex. 471, 3 S. W. 703 (1887). But
see Evans v. Opperman, 76 Tex. 293, 13 S. W. 312 (1890) ("Their children"
used as designation of beneficiary precluded later children by a second wife.).
1"45 & 46 Via c. 75, §11 (1882) ("A policy of assurance effected by any
man on his own life, and expressed to be for the benefit ... of his wife and
children, or any of them.., shall create a trust iii favor of the objects therein
named, and the moneys payable under such policy shall not so long as any
object of the trust remains unperformed form part of the estate of the insured
or be subject to ... his debts....").
r. In re Browne's Policy, [19031 1 Ch. 188.
" Whiteselle v. N. W. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 221 S. W. 575 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1920).
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaeffer, 94 U. S. 457, 24 L. ed. 251 (1877)
(the leading case on the point. It is regularly cited for the proposition but it
was expressly decided on the grounds that the insurance was joint and hence
supportable marriage or no marriage.) ; In re Orear, 111 C. C. A. (8th) 150,
189 Fed. 883 (1911); Filley v. Ill. Life Ins. Co., 93 Kan. 193, 144 Pac. 259

(1914).
2

' Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 46 Conn. 79 (1878); Doney v. Eq. Life
Assur. soc. of the U. S., supra note 9.
Pike County Mut. Life Ass'n. v. Berry, supra note 5.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
been passed on in North Carolina; so it is possible that our statute22
which provides that a divorcee "shall thereby lose all his or her right
and estate in the real or personal estate of the other party ... which
was settled upon such party in consideration of the marriage alone"
might apply. 23 The principal case seems to be the first to consider
the changed status of step-children.
In arriving at the disposition made of the divorce cases, the courts
have not reached an entirely satisfactory solution of the problem.
It is probable that insureds' minds are, in general, centered on the
idea of protection and a holding which makes the policy a gift is a
violation of their intention. A second objection is that in granting
divorces courts make a disposition of the pecuniary relationships between the parties. A consideration of any life insurance involved
seems necessary to such a settlement. If it is not taken into account
at that time, it might well be considered property not awarded to
the wife.
PETER HAIRSTON.

Libel and Slander-The Use of Extrinsic Facts to Identify
the Plaintiff.
A newspaper publication referring to a white man as a negro was
held not to constitute a libel on his white parents, where it neither
named nor referred to them.1
It is well settled that a written description of a white person as a
negro is libelous.2 But the principal case raises the question as to
when the libelous publication refers to a person sufficiently to enable
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1911) §2522.

I A general order issued pursuant to Ky. CML PRAcrica CODE (Carroll,
1932) §425 which provides that "Every judgment for a divorce from the bond
of matrimony shall contain an order restoring any property not disposed of at
the commencement of the action, which either party may have obtained, directly
or indirectly, from or through the other, during marriage, in consideration or
by reason thereof . . ." was held to abrogate a divorced wife's status as
beneficiary of a policy of insurance on her husband's life. Shauberger v.
Morel's Adm'r., 168 Ky. 368, 182 S. W. 198 (1916).
'Atlanta Journal Co. v. Farmer, 172 S. E. 647 (Ga. App. 1934) (Plaintiff's
son was a convict. After having fallen under extreme heat he was chained to
a telephone pole, where he soon died of sunstroke. The defamatory article
reported the indictment of highway employees to answer for the death of the
"negro convict.").
2
Stultz v. Cousins, 242 Fed. 794 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); Upton v. TimesDemocrat Publishing Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1900); Flood v. News &
Courier Co., 71 S. C. 112, 50 S. E. 637 (1905). When such description is
made by spoken words, it is not actionable without proof of special damages.
Deese v. Collins, 191 N. C. 749, 133 S. E. 92 (1926) commented upon (1927)
5 N. C. L. Rxv. 183.

